U.S.
Department of State Human Rights Report 1998
Hong
Kong (only) 1999
Taiwan
(only) 1999
The Constitution provides for freedom of religious belief; however,
the Government seeks to restrict religious practice to governmentsanctioned
organizations and registered places of worship and to control the
growth and scope of the activity of religious groups. During the year,
some unregistered religious groups were subjected to increased restrictions,
although the degree of restrictions varied significantly from region
to region and the number of religious adherents, in both unregistered
and registered churches, continued to grow rapidly. The Criminal Law
states that government officials who deprive citizens of religious
freedom may, in serious cases, be sentenced to up to 2 years in prison.
However, there are no known cases of persons being punished under
this statute.
The State Council's Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB) is responsible
for monitoring and judging the legitimacy of religious activity. The
RAB and the CCP United Front Work Department, staffed by officials
who are rarely religious adherents, provide policy "guidance
and supervision" over implementation of government regulations
on religious activity, as well as the role of foreigners in religious
activity.
During the year, the Government continued a national campaign to enforce
1994 State Council regulations that require all places of worship
to register with government religious affairs bureaus and come under
the supervision of official "patriotic" religious organizations.
There are six preconditions for the establishment of venues for religious
activity: Possession of a meeting place; citizens who are religious
believers and who regularly take part in religious activity; an organized
governing board; a minimum number of followers; a set of operating
rules; and a legal source of income.
At the end of 1997, the Government reported that there were more than
85,000 approved venues for religious activities. Some groups registered
voluntarily, some registered under pressure, while authorities refused
to register others. Unofficial groups claimed that authorities often
refuse them registration without explanation. According to the Government,
these refusals were mainly the result of inadequate facilities and
meeting spaces. Many religious groups have been reluctant to comply
with the regulations out of principled opposition to state control
of religion or due to fear of adverse consequences if they reveal,
as required, the names and addresses of church leaders. In some areas,
efforts to register unauthorized groups are carried out by religious
leaders and civil affairs officials. In other regions, registration
is performed by police and RAB officials, concurrently with other
law enforcement actions. Police closed many "underground"
mosques, temples, seminaries, Catholic churches, and Protestant "house
churches," many with significant memberships, properties, financial
resources, and networks. At times leaders of unauthorized groups are
the targets of harassment, interrogations, and detention, and physical
abuse.
In certain regions, government supervision of religious activity is
minimal, although local implementing regulations in other places,
such Zhejiang, Guangxi, Shanghai, and Chongqing call for strict government
oversight. In some parts of the country, registered and unregistered
churches are treated similarly by authorities, existing openly side
by side, and many congregants worship in both types of churches. In
other areas, particularly where considerable unofficial and unregistered
religious activity takes place, authorities closely monitor places
of worship and take action against unregistered churches. The relationship
between unregistered and registered churches can be tense. Some house
church members maintained that authorities had renewed efforts in
the last half of the year to register house churches and to harass
those who resist, especially in Henan and Shandong provinces. Throughout
the year, the Government moved swiftly against houses of worship outside
its control that grow too large or espouse beliefs that it considers
threatening to "state security." In October and November,
approximately 140 house church worshipers were detained in central
Henan after attending services that attracted participants from other
provinces and from outside China.
The law does not prohibit religious believers from holding public
office; however, most influential positions in state units are reserved
for party members and Communist Party officials state that party membership
and religious belief are incompatible. The Communist Party reportedly
issued a circular in 1997 ordering party members not to adhere to
religious beliefs. This followed a 1995 document circulated to party
organizations at the provincial level ordering the expulsion of party
members who belong to religious organizations, whether open or clandestine.
The People's Liberation Army's "Routine Service Regulations"
state explicitly that servicemen "may not take part in religious
or superstitious activities." There is no available evidence
indicating whether party or PLA military personnel were expelled under
such regulations. According to government officials, 20 to 25 percent
of local Communist Party officials engage in some kind of religious
activity. Most officials who practice a religion are Buddhist or believe
in a folk religion. Religious figures are included in national-level
government organizations. The National People's Congress (NPC) includes
several religious leaders, including Pagbalha Geleg Namgyai, a Tibetan
"living Buddha," who is a vice chairman of the Standing
Committee of the NPC. Religious groups also are represented in the
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, a forum for multiparty
cooperation and consultation led by the CCP, which advises the Government
on policy.
After forcefully suppressing all religious observances and closing
all seminaries during the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution, the Government
began in the late 1970's to restore or replace some damaged or confiscated
churches, temples, mosques, and monasteries, and to allow the reopening
of seminaries. Implementation of this policy has varied from locality
to locality. According to official figures published in late 1997,
there are over 180 million religious adherents, over 3,000 religious
organizations, about 300,000 clergy, and 74 religious schools and
colleges. Official religious organizations administer local Bible
schools, nearly two dozen Catholic and Protestant seminaries, nine
institutes to train imams and Islamic scholars, and institutes to
train Buddhist monks. Students who attend these institutes must demonstrate
"political reliability," and all graduates must pass an
examination on their theological and political knowledge to qualify
for the clergy. The Government permitted some Catholic and Protestant
seminarians, Muslim clerics, and Buddhist clergy to go abroad for
additional religious studies. In most cases, funding for these training
programs is provided by foreign organizations. Both official and unofficial
churches have problems training adequate numbers of clergy to meet
the needs of their growing congregations. However, unofficial churches
have particularly significant problems training clergy or sending
students to study overseas, and many clergy receive only limited and
inadequate preparation.
The authorities permit officially sanctioned religious organizations
to maintain international contacts that do not entail "foreign
control." What constitutes "control" is not defined.
Regulations enacted in 1994 codified many existing rules involving
foreigners, including a ban on proselytizing by foreigners, but allow
foreign nationals to preach to foreigners, bring in religious materials
for their own use, and preach to Chinese at churches, mosques, and
temples at the invitation of registered religious organizations. Missionaries
officially are not permitted, but foreign Christians currently are
teaching English and other languages on college campuses with minimum
interference from authorities as long as their proselytizing is low
key. In recent years, some local authorities have subjected worship
services of alien residents to increased surveillance and restrictions.
The Government continued to engage in international dialog on religious
issues. China invited an increasing number of foreign religious organizations
to visit religious sites and talk to official religious leaders and
figures. As a result of the October 1997 summit between President
Clinton and President Jiang a delegation of three American religious
leaders traveled to China in February at the invitation of President
Jiang to open a bilateral dialog on issues of religious freedom. After
the visit, President Jiang, who met personally with the three religious
leaders, commissioned the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)
to draft separate volumes on Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism,
Islam, and Taoism--the five "official" religions--for study
by government and party cadres.
Buddhists make up the largest body of religious believers. The Government
estimates that there are more than 100 million Buddhists, most of
whom are from the dominant Han ethnic group. However, it is difficult
to estimate accurately the number of Buddhists because they often
practice their faith without participating in public ceremonies. The
Government reports that there are 13,000 Buddhist temples and monasteries
and more than 200,000 nuns and monks. Local governments strictly enforced
regulations on places of worship, particularly illegally constructed
Buddhist temples and shrines. During a May conference in Hunan on
provincial religious work, a senior provincial party official said
that goals for the coming year were to: "Tighten management of
places of religious activities, properly handle issues concerning
the indiscriminate establishment of temples and the setting up of
outdoor Buddha statues, and crack down on heretical religious organizations
and illegal religious activities." The traditional folk religion
(worship of local gods, heroes, and ancestors) of 75 percent of the
population has been attacked as "feudal superstition" and
thousands of religious shrines have been destroyed. Nonetheless, folk
religion has revived in recent years and is tolerated unofficially
to varying degrees as a loose affiliate of Taoism or as an ethnic
minority cultural practice. (A discussion of government restrictions
on Tibetan Buddhism can be found in the Tibet addendum to this report.)
According to government figures, there are 18 million Muslims, 30,000
Islamic places of worship, and more than 40,000 imams. In some areas
where ethnic unrest has occurred, officials continue to restrict the
building of mosques and the religious education of youths under the
age of 18. After a series of violent incidents in Xinjiang in 1997,
police cracked down on Muslim religious activity and places of worship,
and local authorities issued regulations further restricting religious
activities and teaching. A May report on Xinjiang People's Radio quoted
a senior provincial official accusing separatists of having "carried
out subversion and sabotage in the region in the name of religious
activities." The official said that the Government must "resolutely
oppose illegal religious activities" and that religious practice
must "uphold the dignity of laws, the interest of the people,
the unification of the motherland, and the unity of the nationalities.
Any violation will not be tolerated by the people's democratic dictatorship"
(see Section 5).
The Government permits and in some cases subsidizes, Muslim citizens
who make the hajj to Mecca. According to government statistics, more
than 45,000 Chinese Muslims have made the pilgrimage in recent years--5,000
in 1998. In November a Qing dynasty mosque was destroyed in Chengdu's
Muslim quarter to make way for a boulevard near an expanded city square
despite strong opposition from the city's Muslim population. The construction
of a new mosque over a complex of retail establishments further offended
the community.
The number of Christians in both official and unofficial churches
continues to grow rapidly, particularly in rural areas. The growth
of unofficial churches has caused concern among many government and
Communist Party officials who perceive unregulated religious gatherings
as a potential challenge to their authority a threat to public order,
and an alternative to Socialist thought. There was evidence that authorities
in some areas continued a concerted effort to crack down on the activities
of the unapproved Catholic and Protestant churches. The Government
officially permits only those Christian churches affiliated with either
the Catholic Patriotic Association/Catholic Bishops Conference or
the (Protestant) Three Self Patriotic Movement/Chinese Christian Council
to operate openly.
In some regions, coexistence and cooperation between official and
unofficial churches is close enough to blur the line between the two.
Coadjutor Bishop Joseph Zen Ze-kiun of Hong Kong said in an address
to the Vatican Synod for Asia in April that "bishops and priests
of the official (Catholic) church today are, with very few exceptions,
zealous workers in the vineyard of the Lord, leading a poor and exemplary
life, respected by the faithful they serve...." However, in some
areas relations between the two churches remain hostile. A Roman Catholic
news agency reported that, from June 25 to July 3, the provincial
government in Gansu "invited" 32 unofficial Catholic church
leaders to attend study sessions, during which they were forced to
sign documents affirming that their faith should "not be linked
with the Pope politically or economically." Two bishops of the
official Catholic Church, who have been recognized by the Vatican
as well, were denied passports to attend the Synod for Asia in April.
The unofficial, Vatican-affiliated Catholic Church claims a membership
far larger than the 4 million persons registered with the official
Catholic Church. Precise figures are difficult to estimate because
many Catholics, particularly in rural areas, attend both official
and unofficial services, but Vatican officials have estimated as many
as 10 million adherents. According to official figures, the government-approved
Catholic Church has 4,000 clergy and over 4,600 churches and meeting
houses. China so far has not agreed to establish diplomatic relations
with the Holy See, and there is no Vatican representative in China.
Bishops in the official Catholic Church are not consecrated by Rome,
but many have been recognized unofficially by Rome.
The Government maintains that there are between 10 and 15 million
registered Protestants, 18,000 clergy, over 12,000 churches, and some
25,000 meeting places. According to foreign experts, perhaps 30 million
persons worship in house churches that are independent of government
control, although estimates by some Chinese house church groups range
as high as 80 million.
This increase in the number of Christians has resulted in a corresponding
increase in the demand for Bibles. In 1998 the Government approved
the printing of more than 3 million Bibles, and there are currently
more than 18 million Bibles in print. One printing company that is
a joint venture with an overseas Christian organization also prints
approximately 500,000 Bibles a year. Although Bibles can be purchased
at some bookstores, they are not readily available and cannot be ordered
directly from publishing houses by individuals. However, they are
available for purchase at most officially recognized churches, and
many house church members buy their Bibles from churches without incident.
Nonetheless, some underground Christians hesitate to buy Bibles at
official churches because such transactions sometimes involve receipts
identifying the purchaser. Foreign experts confirm reports of chronic
shortages of Bibles, mostly due to logistical problems in disseminating
Bibles to rural areas. However, they note that the situation has improved
in recent years due to improved distribution channels, including to
house churches. Customs officials continue to monitor for the "smuggling"
of Bibles and other religious materials into the country.
In some areas, security authorities used threats, demolition of unregistered
property, extortion of "fines," and interrogation to harass
religious figures and followers. Implementing regulations, provincial
work reports, and other government and party documents continued to
exhort officials to enforce vigorously government policy regarding
unregistered churches. In March the Guangzhou Municipal People's Congress
passed highly restrictive religious regulations. Zhejiang province
also promulgated new Religious Affairs Regulations that stipulated
that "illegal" property and income would be confiscated
from those who "1) preside over or organize religious activities
at places other than those for religious activities or at places not
approved by a religious affairs department; 2) do missionary work
outside the premises of a place of religious activity; and 3) sponsor
religious training activities without obtaining the approval of a
religious affairs department at or above the county level." In
particular, authorities targeted unofficial religious groups in Beijing
and the provinces of Henan and Shandong, where there are rapidly growing
numbers of unregistered Protestants, and Hebei, a center of unregistered
Catholics. In Henan there were reports that police raided two house
church services and detained approximately 140 worshipers, beating
some of them in the process. On October 26, the Public Security Bureau
broke up a house service and detained 40 house church members in Liuwan.
According to reports some were beaten. On November 5, the Public Security
Bureau surrounded a gathering of house church members in Nanyang and
detained over 100 persons, including church leaders who reportedly
were beaten. Some house church leaders have alleged that this raid
was initiated at the urging of officials from the local branch of
the Three-Self Patriotic Movement.
In some cases, public security officials have used prison or reform-through-education
sentences to enforce regulations. Evangelist Xu Yongze, a leader of
the Protestant "unity movement," continues to serve a 3-year
reform-through-labor sentence in Pingyuan prison in Henan for allegedly
disturbing public order. The Government's 1997 White Paper on Religious
Freedom stated that Xu had violated the law by promoting a cult, preaching
that the Apocalypse was near, and asking worshipers to wail in public
spaces for several consecutive days. Group members deny these charges.
Xu's colleagues Qin Baocai and Mu Sheng continue to serve reeducation-through-labor
sentences. In September a group of leaders from house church networks
met in Henan and issued a public communique calling on the Government
to enter into a dialog with unofficial Protestant churches, to release
all religious prisoners, and to redefine what constitutes a "cult."
In December another communique set forth a common theological creed
and a joint position on relations with the Government. House church
pastor Allen Yuan, 85, reportedly was placed under virtual house arrest
for a period of time in June and again in August after he held a large
ceremony in which 350 worshipers were baptized.
In May the authorities released 78-year-old Roman Catholic Bishop
Zeng Jingmu 6 months before the end of his 3year reeducation sentence
after foreign governments and religious leaders interceded on his
behalf. He is reportedly under house arrest.
In Hebei, where perhaps half of China's Catholics reside, friction
between unofficial Catholics and local authorities continued. Hebei
authorities have been known to force many underground priests and
believers to make a choice of either joining the "patriotic"
church or facing punishment such as fines, job loss, and, in some
cases, having their children barred from school. The whereabouts of
Roman Catholic Bishop Su Zhimin, whose followers reported that he
was arrested in October 1997, remained unclear. Underground Catholic
sources in Hebei claimed that he was still under detention, while
the Government denied having taken "any coercive measures"
against him. Reliable sources reported that Bishop An Shuxin, Bishop
Zhang Weizhu, Father Cui Xing, and Father Wang Quanjun remained under
detention in Hebei. The Cardinal Kung Foundation reported that Father
Wei Jingkun and Sister Zhang Yanzhi were detained in August for celebrating
the Feast of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary, and that Bishop
Jia Zhiguo was detained during the June visit of President Clinton.
Reliable sources reported that priests Dong Zhenlu, Chun Yunpeng,
and Zhang Ruowang were detained in February; some linked their detention
to the visit to China of three foreign religious leaders. Father Lu
Genyou and Father Shi Wende reportedly were detained in the spring.
Underground Catholic Bishop Joseph Fan Zhongliang of Shanghai remained
under surveillance and often had his movements restricted. A delegation
of American religious leaders was prevented from seeing him when they
visited Shanghai in February. In November Roman Catholic priest Li
Qinghua was arrested. According to press reports, Li has been tortured
since his arrest, including by being forced to have sexual intercourse
with prostitutes.
Religious groups that preached beliefs outside the bounds of officially
approved doctrine- -such as the coming of the Apocalypse--often were
singled out for harassment. Police continued their efforts to close
down an underground evangelical sect called the "Shouters,"
a branch of a pre-1949 indigenous Protestant group. The sect has been
deemed an antigovernment, counterrevolutionary "cult." Since
the early 1980's, authorities repeatedly have detained, fined, or
imprisoned its members. Independent observers report an increase of
nontraditional sects in recent years.
th
The Government maintains tight controls on religious practices. While
it allows a number of forms of religious activity in Tibet, it does
not tolerate religious manifestations that advocate Tibetan independence
or any expression of separatism, which it describes as "splittism."
The Government harshly criticizes the Dalai Lama's political activities
and leadership of a government-in-exile. The official press continued
to criticize vehemently the "Dalai clique" and repeatedly
described the Dalai Lama as a "criminal" who was determined
to split China, in an attempt to undermine the credibility of his
religious authority. Both central government and local officials often
insist that dialog with the Dalai Lama is essentially impossible and
claim that his actions belie his repeated public assurances that he
does not advocate independence for Tibet. Nonetheless, the Government
reiterated on numerous occasions that it has channels of communication
with the Dalai Lama. During June both President Jiang Zemin and the
Dalai Lama expressed readiness for dialog; however, China later rebuffed
efforts by the Dalai Lama to begin such a dialog.
Most Tibetans practice Buddhism to some degree. This holds true for
many ethnic Tibetan government officials and Communist Party members.
Some 1,000 religious figures hold positions in local people's congresses
and committees of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
However, the Government, continues to insist that party members and
government employees adhere to the party's code of atheism. According
to reports, there have been instances of Chinese authorities threatening
to terminate Tibetan government employees whose children are studying
in India if they did not bring the children back to Tibet.
Buddhist monasteries and proindependence activism are closely associated
in Tibet. Throughout the year, the Government expanded its patriotic
education campaigns begun in 1996 in three monasteries near Lhasa
(Ganden, Sera, and Drepung), to include monasteries throughout the
Tibet Autonomous Region, and widened the campaign into Tibetan areas
in other provinces. In one ethnically Tibetan area of Sichuan province,
five monks who refused to participate in the campaign and organized
displays of the Dalai Lama's photographs reportedly were arrested.
The campaigns, which have been largely unsuccessful in changing Tibetans'
attitudes, are aimed at controlling the monasteries and expelling
sympathizers of Tibetan independence and supporters of the Dalai Lama.
According to the Dalai Lama, monks are required to be "patriotic"
and sign a declaration agreeing to reject independence for Tibet;
reject the boy selected by the Dalai Lama as the 11th reincarnation
of the Panchen Lama; reject and denounce the Dalai Lama; recognize
the unity of China and Tibet; and not listen to the Voice of America.
According to some reports, monks who refused to sign were expelled
from their monasteries and were not permitted to return home to work.
Portraits of the boy selected by the Government to be the Panchen
Lama were on prominent display in some monasteries, as were sets of
rules governing religious activity. Resistance to the campaigns was
intense, and the Government's efforts were deeply resented both by
monks and by lay Buddhists, some of whom fled Tibet. Approximately
3,000 Tibetans enter Nepal each year to escape conditions in Tibet,
according to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.
According to one NGO, 15 monks were arrested at the remote Rongpo
Rabten monastery for staging a proindependence protest during a government-run
patriotic education campaign. Western press reports also indicated
that the Jonang Kumbum monastery, near Lhasa, was closed, also following
a patriotic education campaign. Also according to NGO reports, 49
monks over the age of 60 were forced to retire from the Youning monastery
in Qinghai province. Senior monks play a crucial role in the transmission
of religious teachings.
Chinese officials state that Tibet has more than 46,300 Buddhist monks
and nuns and approximately 1,780 monasteries, temples, and religious
sites. This number represents only the figures for the Tibet Autonomous
Region. There are proportionate numbers of monks and nuns in other
Tibetan areas of China. However, the Government has moved to curb
the proliferation of Tibetan Buddhist monasteries, which it charges
are a drain on local resources and a conduit for political infiltration
by the Tibetan exile community. The Government generally imposes strict
limits on the number of monks in major monasteries; however, these
restrictions are not always enforced. Following disturbances in the
Ganden monastery near Lhasa in May 1996 and the subsequent campaigns,
the number of monks there reportedly decreased from 700 to 500.
The Government continues to oversee the daily operations of major
monasteries. Although the Government generally contributes only a
small percentage of the monasteries' operational funds, it retains
management control of the monasteries through the government-controlled
democratic management committees and the local religious affairs bureaus.
In April 1996, regulations restricted leadership of management committees
of monasteries to "patriotic and devoted" monks and nuns
and specified that the Government must approve all members of the
committees. Despite these government efforts to control monasteries,
antigovernment sentiment remains strong.
The Government continued to insist that the boy it selected and enthroned
in 1995 is the Panchen Lama's 11th reincarnation. The boy has appeared
publicly in Beijing only on rare occasions and has not been permitted
to visit Tibet in over 2 years. In February the boy attended a religious
ceremony at a monastery in Beijing. At all other times he was held
incommunicado by Chinese authorities. Meanwhile, the Government also
continued to detain Gendun Choeyki Nyima, who the Dalai Lama designated
the 11th Panchen Lama. The boy's family also was detained. The Government
refused to provide access to either of the boys or their families,
whose exact locations were unknown. Local authorities say that both
boys are being well cared for and receiving a good education, but
the Government has not allowed international observers the access
necessary to confirm this. The majority of Tibetan Buddhists recognize
the boy designated by the Dalai Lama as the Panchen Lama. Tibetan
monks have claimed that they were forced to sign statements pledging
allegiance to the boy the Government selected as the reincarnation
of the Panchen Lama. The party also urged its members to support the
"official" Panchen Lama, and the Propaganda Department of
the Communist Party Committees at both the regional and city levels
had pictures of the boy printed for use in public and private religious
displays.
In June the European Union issued a report based on the trip of its
ambassadorial delegation to Tibet in early May. The report was highly
critical of the Government's control of religious freedom and stated
that "the delegation was in no doubt that the authorities in
the TAR exercise extremely tight control over the principal elements
of Tibetan religion and culture."
Economic Development and Protection of Cultural Heritage
Tibetans, along with China's 54 other minority ethnic groups, receive
preferential treatment in marriage and family planning policies, and,
to a lesser extent, in university admissions, and in government employment.
Seventy-five percent of all government employees in Tibet are ethnic
Tibetans. Nonetheless, most positions of real power are held by ethnic
Han, and most key decisions in Tibet are made by Chinese. Although
government regulations stipulate that government and legal documents
are to be in Tibetan, in practice written communications by officials
and government documents very frequently are in Chinese. In the area
of private sector employment, discrimination against Tibetans is widespread.
The central Government and other provinces of China heavily subsidize
the Tibetan economy, which has grown by an average annual rate of
over 10 percent between 1989 and 1997. Over 90 percent of Tibet's
budget income comes from outside sources. Tibet also benefits from
a wide variety of favorable economic and tax policies. However, these
policies have attracted growing numbers of ethnic Han and Hui (Muslim)
immigrants from other parts of China, who are competing with--and
in some cases displacing--Tibetan enterprises and labor. Government
development policies have helped raise the economic living standards
of ethnic Tibetans, but many benefits of development accrue primarily
to Han Chinese. For example, in many areas of Lhasa, almost all small
businesses are run by Han. Rapid economic growth, the expanding tourism
industry, and the introduction of more modern cultural influences
also have disrupted traditional living patterns and customs, causing
environmental problems and threatening traditional Tibetan culture.
Illiteracy levels are high. The current illiteracy rate for all Tibetans
is approximately 40 percent, and in some areas it reaches 80 percent.
The Internet has been open to the public just since April. There are
a limited number of gateways and only 70 subscribers. Chinese officials
have over the past few years downgraded the use of Tibetan in education.
Primary schools at the village level teach in Tibetan, but these schools
usually have only two or three grades.
According to official statistics, approximately 78 percent of eligible
children attend primary school, but most pupils end their formal education
after graduating from village schools. The Government announced in
1997 that it would abandon efforts to keep elementary education entirely
in Tibetan and begin teaching Chinese to Tibetan children starting
in the first grade. The Government stated that this step was taken
in order to make Tibetan children more competitive with their Han
counterparts, and provide more educational and employment opportunities
in the long run. According to local education officials, Tibetan is
the main language of instruction in 60 percent of middle schools,
although there are special classes offering instruction in Chinese.
NGO's maintain that this figure is high. Most, but not all, of the
students in these Chinese classes are ethnic Han. Experimental Tibetan
middle schools, which had been established in the 1980's, and were
reportedly successful, closed down. Most of those who attend regional
high schools continue to receive some of their education in Tibetan,
but knowledge of Chinese is essential, as most classes are in Chinese.
Knowledge of Chinese also is necessary to receive a higher education.
Since the mid1980's, the Government has allocated funds to enable
Tibetan secondary students to study in schools elsewhere in China.
According to government figures, there are at present 13,000 Tibetan
students studying in some 100 schools in different parts of China.
Tibet University is a small university with 1,300 students established
to train Tibetan teachers for the local educational system. Ethnic
Tibetans resent disproportionate Han representation in the student
body and faculty. Tibetans, officially said to constitute approximately
95 percent of the region's population, make up only 80 percent of
Tibet University's student body, and 30 percent of all university
faculty in the Tibet Autonomous Region. Although Tibetans are given
admission preferences, Han Chinese students frequently gain admission
because they score higher on admission exams due to stronger Chinese
language skills and educational backgrounds. Authorities reportedly
require professors, particularly those from Tibet University's Tibetan
Language Department, which is viewed as a potential source of dissent,
to attend political education sessions and limit course studies and
materials in an effort to prevent "separatist" political
and religious activity on campus. Many ancient texts are banned for
political reasons. The Tibetan Language Department, which was closed
to new students in the fall of 1997, was reopened in 1998 after its
curriculum had been purged of religious and "separatist"
materials.
The Dalai Lama and Tibetan experts have expressed concern that development
projects and other central government policies adopted at a 1994 national
work conference on Tibet encourage a massive influx of Han Chinese
into Tibet, which has the effect of overwhelming Tibet's traditional
culture and diluting Tibetan demographic dominance. In recent years,
in Lhasa and other urban areas, freer movement of persons throughout
China, governmentsponsored development, and the prospect of economic
opportunity in Tibet, have led to a substantial increase in the non-Tibetan
population (including China's Muslim Hui minority as well as Han Chinese).
An increased number of immigrants from China's large transient population
seek to take advantage of these new economic opportunities. Most of
these migrants profess to be temporary residents, but small businesses
run by ethnic Han and Hui citizens (mostly restaurants and retail
shops) are becoming more numerous in almost all Tibetan towns and
cities. In Lhasa the Chinese cultural presence is obvious and widespread.
Buildings are of the Chinese architectural style, the Chinese language
is widely spoken, and Chinese characters are used in most commercial
and official communications. Some observers have estimated that about
one- half of the population in the city is Han Chinese; elsewhere,
the Han percentage of the population is significantly lower. In rural
areas, the Han presence is often negligible. Chinese officials assert
that 95 percent of Tibet's officially registered population is Tibetan,
with Han and other ethnic groups making up the remaining 5 percent.
This figure does not include the large number of "temporary"
Han residents including military and paramilitary troops and their
dependents, many of whom have lived in Tibet for years.
China's economic development policies, fueled in Tibet by central
government subsidies, are modernizing parts of Tibetan society and
changing traditional Tibetan ways of life. Although the Government
has made efforts in recent years to restore some of the physical structures
and other aspects of Tibetan Buddhism and Tibetan culture damaged
or destroyed during the Cultural Revolution, repressive social and
political controls continue to limit the fundamental freedoms of ethnic
Tibetans and risks undermining Tibet's unique cultural, religious
and linguistic heritage.
Source: Country Reports
on Human Rights Practices for 1998, U.S. Department of State.
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